The Impoverished Island: Development Intervention in Madagascar by Eubanks, Taylor
The Catalyst
Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 7
2012
The Impoverished Island: Development
Intervention in Madagascar
Taylor Eubanks
University of Southern Mississippi
Follow this and additional works at: http://aquila.usm.edu/southernmisscatalyst
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catalyst by an
authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more information, please contact Joshua.Cromwell@usm.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eubanks, Taylor (2012) "The Impoverished Island: Development Intervention in Madagascar," The Catalyst: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 7.
DOI: 10.18785/cat.0201.07
Available at: http://aquila.usm.edu/southernmisscatalyst/vol2/iss1/7
The Impoverished Island: Development Intervention in Madagascar 
Taylor Eubanks 
only 24.5% of 
men are illit-
erate.10 Mada-
gascar pro-
M adagascar, an island nation in Africa, is mired in pov-erty; approximately 76.5% of its population lives be-low the national poverty line of less than $1 per day. 1 
Instances of extreme poverty cannot be explained by single dimen-
sion, clearly delineated, universally applicable causes and solutions; 
rather, extreme poverty must be analyzed as a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon created and perpetuated by conditions specific to indi-
vidual societies and communities. To speak broadly of poverty and 
its causes fails to provide an accurate depiction of why a country is 
poor. The extreme impoverishment found in Madagascar is the re-
sult of cumulative conditions specific to the country, none of which 
can be fully ascertained without first examining factors relevant to 
Madagascar and its poverty; these factors are its geography and cli-
mate, its population and quality of life, its economy and political 
structure, as well as its history. It is only through this understanding 
that workable solutions to the challenges facing Madagascar can be 
established. 
Located off the east coast of Africa, Madagascar is the fourth 
largest island nation in the world. Due to its geographical isolation 
from the mainland of Africa, Madagascar holds unique species of 
flora and fauna; in fact, an estimated 75 percent of the wildlife is 
indigenous to the island.2 As fragi le as it is distinctive, the eco-
system of Madagascar has suffered dramatic deterioration. 3 Once 
teeming with flora, Madagascar's barren plains can be attributed to 
widespread deforestation caused by slash-and-bum agriculture and 
clear-cutting for firewood .4 Deforestation is a serious impediment 
to the country's economic development.5 In addition, the warm 
waters of the Indian Ocean make the island extremely vulnerable 
to cyclones and tropical storms, which frequently cause destruc-
tive flooding and torrential rain.6 The interaction of geography and 
climate in Madagascar simultaneously enriches and imperils the is-
land through its biodiversity and its vulnerability to natural hazards 
respectively.7 
The population ofMadagascar is approximately 22 million with a 
stable annual growth rate of roughly 3% over the past decade.8 As 
previously mentioned, the most recent data reveals that 76.5% of 
the population is below the poverty line, with a per capita income 
of just $1,000.9 While the majority of Malagasy over the age of 15 
are literate, 31.1% of Malagasy are still unable to read and write. 
Illiteracy is more prevalent among women in Madagascar with 
37.5% of women unable to read and write, whereas 
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vides mandatory schooling for 
boys and girls aged six to four-
teen, which includes five years 
of primary education and four 
years of secondary education. 11 
Since its implementation, man-
datory education has greatly 
affected the overall percentage 
of Malagasy children enrolled 
in school; almost 90% of all 
children in Madagascar were 
enrolled in school in 2008.12 
However, since the coup d'etat 
m 2009, national budget-
ary cuts have undermined the 
progress in education achieved 
in the past decade. Down from 
almost full enrollment in pri-
mary school in 2008, 14% of 
children between the ages of 
six and ten are no longer en-
rolled in school. 13 The cuts 
in funding for education have 
also affected completion rates 
of primary education, in which 
only a meager 60% of Mala-
gasy children complete their 
primary education. Of those 
that do complete their primary 
education, less than 35% con-
tinue on to enroll in secondary 
education; of those that do, only 
54.3% complete the secondary 
level of education. At the ter-
tiary level, only 11.6% enroll 
and just 8.3% complete their 
tertiary education. 14 Howev-
er, because mandatory educa-
tion is coeducational, girls and 
boys have similar enrollment 
ratios. As education levels ad-
vance, a small gap emerges be-
tween enrollment levels of girls 
and boys; the ratio of girls to 
boys attending school is 97% in 
primary, 94% in secondary, and 
89% in tertiary education. 15 
While these numbers indi-
cate a higher level of structural 
equality in Madagascar than in 
other similarly impoverished 
nations, there is still a discrep-
ancy between men and women 
within the workforce in both 
position and pay rate. Men are 
typically paid more and given 
better positions than women; 
this gap has diminished in re-
cent years, but the disparity per-
sists.16 Women earn just 7 1% 
of what men earn and comprise 
only 8% ofParliament. 17 Wom-
en do have the same legal rights 
as men in Madagascar, but cus-
toms frequently restrict women 
from exercising these rights.18 
High fertility rates of 5.02 chil-
dren born per woman serve as 
another indication of the limi-
tations on Malagasy women. 19 
Poor nutrition is another serious 
human capital impediment in 
Madagascar; the caloric intake 
of more than two-thirds of the 
population in Madagascar is be-
low the minimum standard of 
what supports normal function-
ing.2o 
Madagascar's GDP is $20.73 
billion; for scale, this places 
Madagascar's GDP as lower 
than 122 other countries. Ag-
riculture accounts for a quar-
ter of Madagascar's GDP and 
the employment of 80% of the 
Malagasy population. The un-
employment rate in Madagascar 
is at a low 2.6%, though many 
Malagasy are self-employed in 
the agricultural sector.21 The 
primary export of Madagascar 
IS textiles, which constituted 
39% of the country's total ex-
ports in 2009. The latest figures 
from 2008 show that foreign aid 
counts for 8.3% of total GDP; 
however, since 2009, foreign 
aid has decreased due to inter-
nal political turmoil. Economic 
growth has been mostly incon-
sistent with occasional dramatic 
fluctuations. Since the coup 
d ' etat in March of 2009, the 
economic growth rate has plum-
meted.22 
The poverty found in Mada-
gascar cannot be explained 
quantitatively with an additive 
approach because poverty Is 
caused by many dynamic fac-
tors which intersect and influ-
ence one another. Malagasy 
poverty is best explained by 
focusing on the conditions that 
trap Madagascar, their impacts 
on the different types of capital, 
and how each of these intersects. 
The major types of capital that 
the poor lack are human capital, 
business capital, infrastructure, 
natural capital, public institu-
tional capital, and knowledge 
capital. Human capital refers to 
what a person needs to be eco-
nomically productive such as 
nutrition and education. Busi-
ness capital refers to the equip-
ment and facilities that enable 
and promote industry. Infra-
structure consists of 
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amenities like roads, water, and 
sanitation. Natural capital refers 
to fertile land and biodiversity. 
Public institutional capital re-
fers to government institutions 
and law. Lastly, knowledge 
capital refers to skill in science 
and technology. While Mada-
gascar does lack many of the 
components of the major types 
of capital, these do not lock the 
country in poverty. Madagas-
car is caught in a series of traps, 
which interact with and shape 
one another; these are the geog-
raphy trap, the conflict trap, and 
the demographic trap.23 
Geography Trap 
The distinctive geographical 
location and features of Mada-
gascar in conjunction with its 
climatic conditions contribute 
to both the immense signifi-
cance of its land and the ex-
treme impoverishment of its 
people. Because of geographic 
and climate conditions, Mada-
gascar is prone to natural disas-
ters; the three natural hazards 
which pose the greatest risk 
to the island and its impover-
ished inhabitants are cyclones 
and tropical storms, floods, and 
drought. Cyclones and tropical 
storms are the leading causes of 
disaster in the country; with an 
average of three passing through 
every year.24 Nineteen cyclones 
have made landfall on the is-
land since January of 2000.25 
Madagascar is exposed to more 
tropical cyclones than any oth-
er African country.26 Flooding 
is a common consequence of 
cyclones and tropical storms, among the impoverished Mala- nana was finally able to end the 
which exacerbates the destruc- gasy population who suffer the blockade with growing military 
tion of the storm. The water consequences of the govern- support, but the blockade had a 
and sanitation problems caused ment's corruption. Since inde- lasting damaging effect on ci-
by extended flooding play a key pendence in 1960, a series of vilians who faced bankruptcy, 
role in the spread of infectious resignations caused by politi- severe malnutrition, and death. 
diseases. Long-term droughts cal crises and power seizes by During Ravalomanana's pres-
are also common in the southern the military have occurred. In idency, Madagascar was seem-
regions of Madagascar and of- 1975, the military appointed a ingly improving as evidenced 
ten lead to the fait- The unyielding series of natural bt.Y strondger i~stittuh-
ure of crops. While wns, a rop m e 
seasonal food short- disasters prevents any real form percentage ofMala-
ages are common, f gasy under the pov-
continued droughts 0 recovery. erty line, increased 
exhaust alternative political accountability, a more 
sources of sustenance, leaving naval officer, Didier Ratsiraka, involved civil society, moder-
those in the affected areas with to the presidency, which he ately successful anti-corruption 
no food or sanitary drinking maintained for 17 years. Due efforts, and improved interna-
waterY The unyielding series to political unrest, Ratsiraka re- tional relations. However, in 
of natural disasters prevents any signed and consented to a refer- December of 2008, the closure 
real form of recovery. As one en dum in 1991 , which produced of an opposition television sta-
of the poorest countries in the a new constitution and called tion by Ravalomanana prompt-
world with 70% of its popula- for democratic elections in the ed violent protests in the capi-
tion below the poverty line, it upcoming year. In 1993, demo- tal. In response, the mayor of 
is beyond the resource capabil- cratically elected Albert Zafy the capital, Andry Rajoelina, 
ity of the Malagasy to repair quickly overstepped the bounds demanded Ravalomanana's res-
the damage of these natural di- of his position, completely dis- ignation.31 In absence ofRaval-
sasters without assistance; eco- regarding the limitations of omanana's acquiescence, Raja-
nomic growth becomes a distant executive power set out in the elina declared himself President 
fantasy. The geography trap constitution, a fact which led in January of 2009, effectively 
leaves Madagascar exposed to to his impeachment in 1996.29 staging a coup d'etat. With the 
destructive natural disasters, Elections were held the follow- military backing Rajoelina, Ra-
which can have devastating im- ing year, and former dictator valomanana was forced to abdi-
pacts on human capital, busi- Ratsiraka was democratically cate authority and ftee.32 Since 
ness capital, infrastructure, and elected.30 The 2001 elections failed attempts to establish a 
natural capital.28 caused a political crisis in Mad- democratic resolution to the po-
Conflict Trap agascar when the results were litical struggle in Madagascar in 
disputed between the two candi- the fall of 2009, Rajoelina has Since the time of French co- · k d dates, incumbent Ratstra a an served as the illegitimate inter-lonial rule, a pattern has devel-
oped in the political history of 
Madagascar; exposed to a series 
of corrupt politicians marked by 
illegitimacy and abuse, politi-
cal unrest is a recurring theme 
Marc Ravalomanana. This led im president of the country.33 
to Ratsiraka staging a six-month 
blockade of the capital city An-
tananarivo where Ravaloma-
nana's government was based. 
By June, Ravaloma-
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According to Freedom House, 
which ranks political and civil 
freedom of countries on a scale 
of 1 (highest degree of freedom) 
to 7 (lowest degree of freedom), 
Madagascar is ranked as partly 
free with a political rights score 
of 6 and a civi l liberties score of 
4.34 According to the scale pro-
vided by Transparency Interna-
tional, Madagascar is very cor-
rupt with a score of 2.6; out of 
178 countries, Madagascar was 
123rd with the same corruption 
perception score as Niger, Er-
itrea, and Armenia.35 These low 
scores can be attributed to the 
events surrounding the coup in 
2009; prior to this political up-
heaval, Madagascar was ranked 
higher in transparency, political 
rights, and civi l rights.36 While 
the coup that stripped Marc Ra-
valomanana of his executive 
power and placed Andre Rajo-
elina as President is the most re-
cent political upheaval in Mad-
agascar, illegitimate politicians, 
vio lence, and abuse are clearly 
common themes in Malagasy 
society.37 Beyond the obvious 
charges of poor governance, 
the political conflict and so-
cial unrest itself carries with it 
economically disabling conse-
quences for the country. When 
economies are already impov-
erished, political instability in-
tensifies the situation, reducing 
and sometimes completely dev-
astating the already limited sup-
ply of human capital, infrastruc-
ture, natural capital, and public 
institutional capitat.38 By trac-
ing the political leadership since 
Madagascar became an inde-
pendent state in 1960, a strong 
pattern of coups, violent power 
changes, and political turmoil is 
very apparent.39 The economic 
consequences of Madagascar's 
long-term political strife are ap-
parent through the drops in both 
economic growth and GDP per 
capita in the years these political 
upheavals occur. For instance, 
during the removal of the dic-
tator Didier Ratsiraka in 1990-
1991, GDP per capita dropped 
by almost 6% while the total 
GDP dropped by over 300%; 
similarly, during the political 
struggle of Ratsiraka and Marc 
Ravalomanana m 2001-2002, 
GDP per capita dropped by al-
most 14% while the total GDP 
again dropped by over 300%. 
Since the coup in 2009, GDP 
per capita has declined by ap-
proximately 9% and total GDP 
has declined by over 300%.40 
Cyclical political turmoil is evi-
dent by the recurring prevalence 
of political upheaval within 
the Malagasy political system. 
Locked into the conflict trap 
which not only creates cyclical 
poverty, but also cyclical politi-
cal turmoil, Madagascar suffers 
the depletion of already scarce 
capital.41 
Demographic Trap 
While the number of women 
taking advantage of the avail-
abi lity of education in Mada-
gascar 1s comparable to the 
number of men, the fertility 
rate in Madagascar is still high 
at 5.02 children per woman.42 
High fertility rates are strong 
indicators of poverty; as fertil-
ity rates drop, poverty declines, 
partially because 
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more children born into an im-
poverished family means fewer 
resources for each individual in 
the family. If a family has only 
one child, all resources can be 
invested into the education and 
livelihood of one child rather 
than being split amongst many 
children, which increases human 
capital. This dynamic causes an 
overall decline in standard of 
living by reducing the supply of 
resources per capita, undermin-
ing the development of human 
capital, weakening natural capi-
tal, and placing additional bur-
dens on infrastructure. Fertility 
rates are also strong indicators 
of poverty because they provide 
insight into the social position 
of women; women in countries 
with high fertility rates typically 
have less access to educational 
and econom1c opportunities. 
The absence of half of a coun-
try's potential labor force is a 
severe impediment to economic 
growth. For these reasons, it 
is apparent that high fertility 
rates exacerbate poverty by di-
minishing human capital and 
knowledge capital.43 
Development Intervention 
While Madagascar is severe-
ly impoverished and caught in 
the geography trap, the con-
flict trap, and the demographic 
trap, it is also a country fortu-
nate enough to have plentiful 
coasts, biodiversity, natural re-
sources, varied climates, and a 
population pursuing education 
and economic growth. Each of 
these factors offers hope that 
the extreme poverty in which tion in Madagascar will be best 
Madagascar has been trapped achieved through a five-stage 
for decades is but a phase, that process of development inter-
the Malagasy may find their vention in conjunction with an 
way out of poverty. At pres- ongoing program that responds 
ent, the traps locking the coun- directly to the interactive nature 
try into a downward economic of the poverty traps and capital 
spiral are interwoven, securely shortages afflicting the nation. 
gripping Madagascar and its While recognizing the chat-
people. With time and tailored Jenges that face the Malagasy is 
development intervention ef- a necessary component of a so-
forts , the clutch ofthese traps on )uti on to their impoverishment, 
Madagascar can be weakened if there are certain approaches 
not entirely removed. Like the that will be more effective than 
multi-dimensional factors that others. Many approaches to de-
contribute to poverty, which velopment undermine the con-
are specific to each society and fidence of the impoverished 
community, the solution to pov- by treating them as "half-devil 
is essential to empowering the 
impoverished and ending their 
economic destitution. Howev-
er, structural inequality is per-
vasive in developing economies 
and exceptionally debilitating 
to the poor. External efforts are 
therefore required in some sec-
tors to allow the impoverished 
fair access to initiatives, posi-
tively influencing their socio-
economic statusY 
Stage 1: Resolving the Con-
flict Trap 
Since the coup d'etat in 2009, 
Madagascar's economy has dra-
matically contracted; the politi-
cal crisis has 
erty IS not 
found m a 
universally 
applicable 
package. 
The eradica-
Once political order is maintained in 
Madagascar, the development of volun-
tary non-state organizations should be 
widespread in order to mobilize citizens 
tion of ex- reason, it ts 
depleted aid 
funding, pn-
vate invest-
ment, and 
fiscal spend-
ing. For this 
treme pov-
erty in any 
against any future coup attempts. of paramount 
society is a complex process, 
which must take into consid-
eration how each independent 
variable contributes to impov-
erishment and how these vari-
ables intersect and influence 
one another. The impoverish-
ment found in Madagascar is 
the result of a chronic lack of 
the major types of capital and 
a series of poverty traps.44 To 
develop workable solutions to 
poverty in Madagascar, the pov-
erty traps and the absence of the 
major types of capital corroding 
the Malagasy economy must be 
addressed independently and 
collectively. Poverty allevia-
and half-child," responsible for 
their situation and incapable of 
contributing to the solution. To 
implement developmental inter-
vention under these assumptions 
is self-defeating and results in 
continued poverty and the dis-
couragement of both donors and 
the poor because confidence in 
individual agency within im-
poverished communities is cor-
related with greater individual 
and communal economic sue-
cess. For this reason, partici-
patory and community-driven 
approaches are the favorable op-
tion. The utilization 
importance that the conflict trap 
is resolved in Madagascar. Un-
til political security is restored 
m Madagascar, its economy 
will continue to decline and fur-
ther impoverish its population.46 
The resolution of the current po-
litical crisis in Madagascar is the 
most pressing issue. Because 
there is evidence that elections 
can pose a greater threat to un-
stable governments in develop-
ing countries than their absence, 
an interim consensus govern-
ment should take the place of 
the illegitimate leadership of 
Andry Rajoelina. All actions in 
responding to the conflict trap 
of these approaches 
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should focus on strengthen-
ing public institutional capital. 
Madagascar needs the focus of 
the international community to 
place pressure on the current re-
gime to facilitate the necessary 
power change. If international 
pressure is ineffective, the mu-
tual efforts of the African Union 
and United Nations need to pro-
vide external military interven-
tion; the African Union provides 
legitimacy to this cause, while 
the United Nations provides 
military equipment and finan-
cial supportY The goal of this 
military intervention is to re-
store authority to the presidency 
and to maintain a military pres-
ence to prevent future coups; 
peacekeeping forces should not 
remain in Madagascar for lon-
ger than a decade. During this 
period, the Malagasy govern-
ment should reduce its own mil-
itary spending and devote the 
resources towards other areas.48 
This approach does have a po-
tential downfall: the actions of 
the United Nations and African 
Union in this intervention could 
be perceived as a neocolonial 
occupation of the country; if the 
operation lacks public support 
from the Malagasy population, 
long-term success is unlikely. 
However, safeguards can be put 
in place to reduce the likelihood 
of this occurring. For instance, 
the African Union 's military 
presence holds more legitimacy 
than that of the United Nations 
and is less likely to be perceived 
as an exercise in neocolonial-
ism from the West. In addition, 
limiting the duration of the in-
tervention to a maximum of 
ten years provides enough time 
to establish a political security 
base upon which to build and 
destroys the indefinite military 
intervention timeline frequently 
found in nation bui lding inter-
ventions. 
Once the current political cri-
sis is resolved, further measures 
can be taken to prevent future 
coups. Madagascar 's suscepti-
bility to political upheaval and 
high coup risk is a reflection of 
structural conditions that have 
fo llowed the country since in-
dependence. Primary explana-
tions for this susceptibility are 
a weak civi l society in Mada-
gascar and a history of effective 
coups.49 While nothing can be 
done to alter Madagascar's po-
litical history, the military inter-
vention provided by the inter-
national community can change 
the political future of the coun-
try; in the long-term, this is the 
most effective way to reduce 
Madagascar's coup risk. Once 
political order is maintained in 
Madagascar, the development 
of voluntary non-state organiza-
tions should be widespread in or-
der to mobilize citizens against 
any future coup attempts. 5° This 
sort of mobilization would re-
quire every community in Mad-
agascar to form at least one or-
ganization; all members of the 
community must be required to 
register in their respective or-
ganizations. The communities 
would then select council mem-
bers to repre sen t 
and manage the organization. 
The government would be re-
quired to provide every orga-
nization with documentation of 
any actions taken by the state as 
well as any plans or proposals 
through its council. The gov-
ernment would also be required 
to provide organizations with 
documentation of its aid budget 
and aid dispersal plan. In taking 
these steps, communities would 
be able to track adherence to 
these plans as well as moni-
tor the activities of the govern-
ment. Council heads would 
attend a monthly meeting with 
the leaders of the country to dis-
cuss community concerns, and 
transport would be provided 
to ensure that all communities 
are fairly represented. In this 
way, the non-state organizations 
would be able to hold the state 
accountable for any detected 
corruption and to mobilize in 
the event of a coup. 
Stage 2: Human Capital In-
vestment and the Demograph-
ic Trap 
The next stage of the Mala-
gasy development intervention 
should focus on empowering 
the poor in Madagascar through 
human capital investment. Hu-
man capital refers to the eco-
nomic productivity of an indi-
vidual in a society as well as 
contributing components like 
nutrition, health, education, 
and skills.51 The types of hu-
man capital are interrelated and 
interactive; the presence of one 
serves as a collective reinforce-
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ment, while the absence of one 
results in their shared deteriora-
tion. For example, malnutrition 
leads to depleted health, increas-
ing susceptibi lity to illness and 
parasitic disease, while lower 
levels of health result in higher 
nutritional needs, unlikely to be 
met in impoverished communi-
ties. 52 Malnutrition also causes 
extensive damage to cognitive 
ability, which limits intelligence 
and learning capability; thus, 
the efficacy of education and at-
tainment of ski lls is reducedY 
In addition, poor health causes 
lower attendance at work and 
in school, which lessens pro-
ductivity and diminishes the 
effect of education. This dy-
namic illustrates that lack of 
one type of human capital cre-
ates a downward spiral of total 
human capital. Consequently, 
the Malagasy development in-
tervention should first target 
the shortage of human capital 
in Madagascar. This would be 
achieved through several simul-
taneous initiatives that improve 
education, mcrease agricul-
tural production, stimulate eco-
nomic productivity, and ensure 
adequate nutrition and health 
care to all of the Malagasy. To 
meet this need, conditional cash 
transfers should be implement-
ed; conditional cash transfers 
provide households or individu-
als with financial incentives for 
investing m human capital.54 
There should be two conditional 
cash transfer programs in effect 
in Madagascar: one to provide 
cash incentives to households 
for their investment in the hu-
man capital of their children 
(Child Investment Scheme), the 
other to provide cash incentives 
to girls and women who invest 
in their own human capital by 
not having children (Women's 
Investment Scheme). These 
programs would address the 
shortage of human capital in 
Madagascar as well as over-
come the demographic trap. 
The Child Investment Scheme 
(CIS) would provide weekly im-
bursements to eligible impover-
ished households who achieve 
all of the benchmarks set up in 
the program. Because the Mal-
agasy possess a greater under-
standing of their communities 
and challenges than external 
assistance representatives do, 
the CIS program would be es-
tablished as a communal project 
with only a few external regula-
tions. This structure would ac-
knowledge the superior insight 
provided by the communities 
of Madagascar and strengthen 
the collective confidence of the 
population. Every community 
would form a CIS committee 
comprised of approximately 30 
local members; these commit-
tees would be responsible for 
determining the standards of 
eligibility as well as the bench-
marks households must meet to 
stay in the program. Each com-
munity would select its commit-
tee members, and women would 
comprise at least half of every 
committee. A CIS Program Ad-
ministrator would be present at 
the initial c o m m i t-
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tee meetings to offer assistance 
and provide insight into the 
program capabilities and ben-
efits. After the CIS program is 
established, a CIS Program Ad-
ministrator would return once 
every four months for a review 
meeting with each committee; 
these meetings would celebrate 
the progress of the program, 
address any shortcomings of 
the program, and make adjust-
ments as deemed necessary by 
the community. To determine 
which households are eligible 
for this program, the committee 
would create a relative measure 
of poverty for the community 
and determine a community 
poverty line. Each committee 
would provide a list of eligibil-
ity requirements based on their 
conclusions, which households 
within that community would 
need to satisfy to be eligible for 
the program. Next, committees 
would determine the most ef-
fective strategies of investment 
in human capital in their com-
munity. By using this approach, 
the Malagasy would have sig-
nificant influence over their own 
communal progress, thereby 
fostering independent agency 
and stronger community ties.55 
There would be some external 
regulations for the program. Stu-
dents who receive fai ling marks 
for one term would be placed 
on probation, which requires an 
individual assessment of what 
areas need to be addressed for 
improvement and a plan of ac-
tion to meet these needs. This 
period would grant the student 
an additional term to improve 
his marks before discontinuing 
his participating in the CIS pro-
gram. If he meets the require-
ments established by his local 
committee and tmproves his 
marks in any subsequent terms, 
he would be eligible for reentry 
into the program. In addition, 
high scores would be reward-
ed with a bonus at the end of 
age in the community. Two 
women from each group would 
be trained to provide informa-
tion to their group about contra-
ceptives, birth control pills, and 
sexually transmitted diseases; 
these women would also be re-
sponsible for distributing con-
traceptives, specifically birth 
control pi lls. Groups would 
have mandatory meetings every 
themselves, they become eco-
nomically independent.56 This 
process is critical to a strong 
development intervention pro-
gram. 
Stage 3: The Green Revolu-
tion 
While the CIS and WIS pro-
grams are being implemented, a 
widespread public information 
initiative would be introduced 
each term. 
Lastly, to 
Increase 
community 
interest m 
the success 
of the pro-
gram, the 
w ·th t d . d to the coun-
' an ecosys em as •verse an valu- try focusing 
able as Madagascar's, further environ- on agricul-
menta/ destruction is not in the best inter- ~r;i1 ca~~~e~~ 
est of the country's future growth . atmmg to 
CIS program for Madagascar 
would reward the community 
with a monthly development 
grant if over 90 percent of par-
ticipating households meet all of 
the human capital benchmarks 
each month. The community 
would have the option to put 
the grant in communal savings 
for later use or to make a com-
munal investment in a develop-
ment project, for which advise-
ment would be offered through 
the CIS Program Administrator. 
The Women's Investment 
Scheme (WIS) would be part 
of the multifaceted approach to 
solving the demographic trap in 
Madagascar. To reduce Mada-
gascar's high fertility rate of 
5.02 children per woman, the 
WIS program would be avail-
able for all females from the 
age of 12. The WIS program 
would create a women's group 
for all women of reproductive 
month. During these meetings, 
the women would be educated 
on topics related to their repro-
ductive health. Upon enroll-
ing in the WIS program, any 
woman of reproductive age who 
does not get pregnant would re-
ceive financial imbursement for 
their effective utilization of the 
program. The rationale behind 
the WIS program is to reduce 
the number of unplanned preg-
nancies as wel l as the high fer-
tility rate in Madagascar. By 
providing women with a finan-
cial incentive to use contracep-
tives, they are more likely to 
break out of the poverty cycle. 
In addition, women's groups 
strengthen the collective voice 
of women m communities 
' 
which is conducive to achieving 
greater gender equality. When 
women take control of their 
reproductive lives and begin 
to make choices for 
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mcrease the 
yield of already cultivated land. 
The Green Revolution has still 
not made its way to Madagas-
car, a fact that has prevented the 
Malagasy from transitioning 
away from subsistence farm-
mg. The Agricultural Intensi-
fication Initiative (All) would 
teach farmers better techniques 
and provide access to neces-
sary technology. This initiative 
would also address the concern 
of environmental degradation in 
Madagascar by promoting soil 
conservation and reforestation. 
Madagascar 's agricultural his-
tory provides a salient example 
of the environmental cost of un-
regulated, uninformed, and un-
sustainable farming techniques. 
With an ecosystem as diverse 
and valuable as Madagascar's, 
further environmental destruc-
tion is not in the best interest of 
the country's future growth.s7 
Because improved agricultural 
techniques and access to af-
fordable inputs mcrease pro-
ductivity, the All would pro-
vide necessary fertilizer, seeds, 
and technology at an affordable 
cost to farmers. 58 To ensure that 
farmers are able to take advan-
tage of the All, payment plans 
would be offered. The All 
would place farmers into groups 
of five with other farmers from 
their communities; these farm-
ers would work together to 
ensure that all succeed. Like 
the community-driven model 
provided by Grameen Bank, 
the All would only allow one 
member of the group to take 
advantage of the payment plan 
option at a time,59 thereby en-
couraging payment and promot-
ing resource sharing for greater 
productivity. In addition, the 
All would be the best method 
to eliminate the threat of de-
forestation in Madagascar. By 
increasing knowledge and crop 
yields, farmers would no longer 
partake in shifting cultivation or 
slash and bum farming. 
Stage 4: Infrastructure and 
Local Markets 
For continued development 
in Madagascar, investments in 
infrastructure are necessary. 
Funding for infrastructure m 
Madagascar would come from a 
combination of aid, government 
investment, and foreign direct 
investment. Investments should 
focus primarily on providing 
roads, safe water, electricity, 
and communication technology. 
With the Green Revolution and 
increased agricultural output 
achieved, infrastructure would 
serve as the logical next step 
in alleviating poverty in Mada-
gascar. All aid and government 
funded projects should be led 
and implemented by Malagasy 
citizens through social business; 
giving the population a stake in 
the success of infrastructure de-
velopment serves as a tool of 
empowerment and increases the 
likelihood of program success.60 
Constructing roads in Madagas-
car would serve as a catalyst for 
economic activity; roads pro-
vide opportunities to the poor 
through lower transport costs 
and access to new occupations. 
Furthermore, roads would save 
time for the Malagasy, which 
can be spent pursuing other 
economic activities. In addition 
to roads, providing a secure, 
sanitary water supply is a criti-
cal step towards development 
in Madagascar, especially since 
its main source of livelihood is 
agriculture. Permanent irriga-
tion structures are necessary for 
farmers whose dependence on 
rain serves as a great disadvan-
tage. However, a secure, sani-
tary water supply is also needed 
for human consumption. When 
there is no stable water supply, 
the people of Madagascar spend 
hours searching for water and 
frequently resort to drinking 
water that is unsafe for human 
consumption, a fact that results 
in waterborne diseases. Elec-
tricity is another valuable re-
source for development. Elec-
tricity provides 
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access to technology, which can 
create livelihood opportunities 
for the poor and allow work to 
continue after the sun has set. 
In addition, telephones would 
assist in alleviating the poverty 
in Madagascar by saving time 
and money for workers who no 
longer have to travel for com-
munication purposes. Lastly, 
providing computers and inter-
net access to communities in 
Madagascar would expose the 
population to new technologies, 
provide new financial opportu-
nities, and offer an abundance 
of information; all of these steps 
would serve to empower the 
Malagasy population.61 
In addition to infrastructure, 
local markets are easy and ef-
fective ways to increase income 
in communities. These markets 
would provide space for peo-
ple to set up shops to sell their 
goods without having to pay 
travel expenses to reach mar-
kets in other areas. When farm-
ers and traders must travel to 
distant markets, they are forced 
to carry products long distanc-
es. Not wanting to carry these 
items back, they settle for prices 
below market value. Because 
local markets do not pose this 
problem, vendors are able to se-
cure better prices. Furthermore, 
creating local markets increases 
the demand for new products 
and provides the incentive for 
locals to meet those needs. Lo-
cal markets are strong commu-
nity bui lders and provide further 
economic opportunities to those 
that need them most. The es-
tablishment of weekly or daily 
markets is a project that would 
mcrease economic prosperity 
in rural communities in Mada-
gascar. Furthermore, because 
the communities are entirely 
responsible for the implemen-
tation of these local markets, 
communal participation in the 
markets is more likely.62 
Stage 5: Diversification and 
Industrial Transition 
It is commonly believed that 
there is a natural resource curse, 
which plagues countries with 
economic instability due to the 
inherent volatility of export 
prices. However, the abundance 
of natural resources in a country 
is not what leads to low growth; 
rather, it is the dependency on a 
single primary export that limits 
the ability of a country to pros-
per. 63 In 2009, textiles com-
prised 39% of Madagascar's 
total export sector; the concen-
tration of trade on a single ex-
port leaves Madagascar vulner-
able to any cyclical variations.64 
While the transition from an ag-
riculturally based export market 
to a manufactured good market 
is a positive step towards de-
velopment, with no other sub-
stantial exports in the sector, 
a country as impoverished as 
Madagascar is not equipped to 
cope with the bust phase of the 
boom and bust cycle of a prima-
ry export market. The volatility 
of the primary export dependent 
economy of Madagascar also 
creates macroeconomic uncer-
tainty, which discourages for-
eign direct investment. For this 
reason, the Malagasy economy 
needs to diversify; economic 
policy should place an emphasis 
on export diversification and the 
creation of new sectors that pro-
duce more value-added, manu-
factured goods for export.65 
Structural models of economic 
development show that diver-
sification from primary exports 
into manufactured exports is a 
route to sustainable economic 
growth.66 This move would cre-
ate additional sources of rev-
enue for the country, encourage 
foreign direct investment, and 
provide some protection from 
the bust phase of the boom and 
bust cycle. 
Once Madagascar has tran-
sitioned beyond subsistence 
farming, investments should be 
refocused to the development 
of manufacturing. With infra-
structure in place, foreign direct 
investment would increase and 
allow industrial growth.67 As 
industries are forming in Mad-
agascar, cheap imports pose a 
great threat to continued growth. 
Unable to compete with inter-
national industries in the early 
stages of the transition from ag-
riculture to industry, the home 
industries in Madagascar would 
need some protection to prevent 
closure. During this transition, 
the government of Madagascar 
should implement industry spe-
cific protectionist-trading poli-
cies so that home industries are 
able to develop. A common cri-
tique of protectionist economic 
poI i c i e s is that the 
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removal of competition results 
m industrial inefficiency and 
low-quality products at higher 
pnces. However, to encour-
age innovation and increased 
efficiency in home industries, 
the government of Madagascar 
would set industry-specific tar-
iffs so that competing products 
are of comparable value to the 
Malagasy versions. Through 
this system, home industries 
would be able to participate in 
market competition and thereby 
yield higher levels of productiv-
ity and innovation. This policy 
would protect Madagascar's 
new industries from the dam-
agmg impact of international 
competition while maintaining 
the benefits of market competi-
tion.68 
Ongoing Development Inter-
vention: Recovery from the 
Geography Trap 
Because there is no method 
of influencing the prevalence 
of natural disasters in Mada-
gascar, the geography trap does 
not have an obvious remedy. 
There are methods to minimize 
the devastating consequences 
of natural disasters in Mada-
gascar, however. While the risk 
of natural disasters cannot be 
eliminated, the geography trap 
can be overcome.69 Japan is 
an example of an island nation 
with a high risk of natural di-
sasters that is equipped to cope 
with the geography trap because 
of its economic development.70 
For this reason, it becomes clear 
that until Madagascar has de-
veloped its economy, it will be 
unable to recover from natural 
disasters without external as-
sistance. The geography trap 
recovery must therefore be an 
ongoing project in Madagascar; 
reducing the devastation of nat-
ural disasters and responding to 
the needs of those impacted by 
them would allow Madagascar 
to continue developing.71 The 
most effective approach to the 
geography trap is to be prepared 
for natural hazards; this means 
that systems should be set up in 
advance to meet the needs of the 
Malagasy impacted by natural 
disasters. The primary concerns 
in the wake of a natural disaster 
are malnutrition, infrastructure 
damage, and economic rum. 
While malnutrition is a continu-
ous problem m Madagascar, 
nutrition depravation is inten-
sified during the lean season in 
January and February when one 
million additional Malagasy fall 
beneath the poverty line, but 
it is especially devastating to 
the drought-laden south. 72 The 
most effective approach to en-
suring access to nutrition in the 
south of the island is through in-
creased agricultural productivity 
throughout the year, specifically 
rice, maize, and cassava crops. 
Through this approach, the 
Malagasy would be empowered 
because they would be serving 
as the catalyst for their own suc-
cess; this approach would also 
increase income for farmers.73 
Concerns over damaged infra-
structure and financial loss are 
especially valid in an impover-
ished society; however, excess inexcusable. While financial 
loss insurance coverage would capabilities of the West may 
take the economic burden of have suffered because of the 
recovery from the victims and 
the Malagasy government. Ex-
cess loss insurance is the most 
common tool of risk transfer 
used in response to natural di-
sasters; this policy spreads the 
risk to the world capital markets 
so that the financial shock is ab-
sorbed by an entity capable of 
handling the bill. Through this 
program, of which the govern-
ment of Madagascar would take 
advantage, the citizens of Mada-
gascar would be protected from 
financial ruin, and damaged in-
frastructure could be repaired. 74 
Why It Matters 
Alleviating poverty in Mada-
gascar is an important task for 
the global community for many 
reasons; the most compelling 
of these is humanitarian relief. 
Even during an economic down-
tum in the developed world, the 
standard of living enjoyed by 
the West is extravagant luxury 
to what many of the citizens of 
Madagascar experience. The 
standard of living in the devel-
oped world is frequently taken 
for granted; the vast majority of 
Westerners do not worry about 
where their next meal wi ll come 
from or where they will find 
safe drinking water. These are 
not concerns that plague West-
em society, but they are the 
norm for many Malagasy. With 
so much excess in the West, 
the severe deprivation found 
m Mada- gascar IS 
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economic downturn, the abil-
ity of developed countries to do 
what is ethical has not dimin-
ished. The high levels of pov-
erty found in Madagascar is but 
one example of the failures of 
the modem world, and the West 
has not only the ability but also 
the obligation to work towards 
its eradication. 
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